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The statutory demand procedure has been a part of our corporate law from its earliest modern 
formulations and it has been suggested, albeit anecdotally, that under the current regime, it gives 
rise to more litigation than any other part of the Corporations Act.  Despite this there has been a lack 
of consideration of the underlying policy behind the procedure in both the case law and literature; 
both of which are largely centred on the technical aspects of the process.  The purpose of this article 
is to examine briefly the process of the statutory demand in the context of the current insolvency 
law in Australia. 
This paper argues that robust analysis of the statutory demand regime is overdue. The paper first 
sets out to discover if there is a policy justification for the process and to articulate what that may 
be. Second, it will briefly examine the current legislation and argue that the structure actually 
encourages litigation which is arguably undesirable in the context of insolvency. In particular we will 
ask if the current rigid legal regime is appropriate for dealing efficiently with the highly charged 
atmosphere of contested insolvency.  Third, it will examine suggested reforms in this area as to 
whether they might be a way forward.  
 
Background 
The statutory demand process dates back to the beginning of the modern forms of company 
legislation. Assaf has traced a form of the statutory demand process back to s 7 of the Winding Up 
Act 1844 (UK)1 whereby an affidavit alleging the debt could be filed in a court and served on the 
company. Then, the company was required to pay within one month after the service or be deemed 
to have committed an act of bankruptcy. The further development in the Joint Stock Companies Act 
1856 (UK) saw the provision for a statutory demand procedure as we would recognise it today.2 The 
statutory demand procedure in Australia was adopted within the various colonies in much the same 
                                                          
1
 Assaf F., Statutory Demands: Law and Practice LexisNexis, Sydney, 2008 at 11 
2
 See s 68. The legislation set up the basic process for winding up by the court. It  provided for the  winding  up 
by the  in a number  of  circumstances,  including  “Whenever the  Company is  unable  to pay its Debts” 
(under s 67). The next section then deemed  the  company to be  unable  to pay its debts if  a creditor who 
was owed a minimum amount had served on the  company a demand and the  company failed to pay, secure  
or  compound  within a period  of  three  weeks succeeding the service. 
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form and remained largely unaltered until the passing of the Harmer3 reforms in 1993.4 The Harmer 
Report was the basis of the changes that lie at the heart of the issues raised here. It is important to 
examine the basis of the comments in that report therefore. 
At the time of the Harmer Report5 it was noted that the statutory demand procedure was largely 
unregulated.  This raised a problem in the Commission’s view that6 
..too often produces disputes about the debt at the hearing of a winding up application. The 
Commission is anxious that this should be avoided. Further, companies often need to bring 
injunction proceedings where a debt claimed in a demand is disputed. The Commission is of 
the view that the legislation should specifically provide for the determination of disputed 
debt issues and other disputes in respect of a statutory demand.  
Exactly what was the “problem” associated with dealing with the dispute as to debts at the time of 
the winding up hearing was not made entirely clear.7 It may be  that the  issue  is  one  of  separating 
the  issues  of the formalities of the  demand from the  underlying  issue  of  the  company’s  
insolvency or  it  may be that there were problems  with the  timing of the  challenge.  Perhaps it 
might also have been some combination of the two broad matters. The Report was also concerned 
with the need to provide a mechanism within the legislation for dealing with disputes as to the 
amount of the demand.8  The Report went on to identify that there should be three grounds for 
challenging the demand, being:9 
 there is a substantial dispute as to whether the debt is owing; 
 the company appears to have a counter-claim which may exceed the amount of the debt; or 
                                                          
3
 Australian Law Reform Commission, Report No 45 General Insolvency Inquiry available at  
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/45/  
Accessed 21 January 2012. This is referred to throughout as the Harmer Report. 
4
 Assaf F., Statutory Demands: Law and Practice LexisNexis, Sydney, 2008 at 16 where it is stated that “It was 
not until the enactment of the Corporate Law Reform Act 1992(Cth), which implemented many of the 
recommendations made by the Harmer Report, that the statutory demand procedure  was radically altered. 
Indeed, immediately prior to the Corporate Law Reform Act coming into effect, the Corporations Law retained 
virtually the same statutory demand procedure as the  original 1856 Act” 
5
 The Report of the Commission was handed down in 1988. 
6
 Australian Law Reform Commission, Report No 45 General Insolvency Inquiry available at  
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/45/  
Accessed 21 January 2012. At [148] 
7
 This issue has  been raised  by Karen O’Flynn in her unpublished  paper The  Harmer Amendments: 15 years  
on available at http://www.claytonutz.com/people/oflynn_karen/docs/UNSW_insolvency_paper.pdf 
Accessed  21 January 2012 
8
 ibid 
9
 Australian Law Reform Commission, Report No 45 General Insolvency Inquiry available at  
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/45/ Accessed 21 January 2012. At [150] 
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 the demand ought to be set aside on other grounds. 
Legislation was passed to give effect to these recommendations in the Corporate Law Reform Act 
1992 (Cth). The amendments were largely intended to give effect to the model suggested by the 
Harmer Report.10 However, as is discussed below in respect of the case law developed since that 
time, the Explanatory Memorandum suggests11 that the  “provisions in relation to the setting aside of 
a statutory demand are intended to be a complete code for the  resolutions  of disputes involving 
statutory demands..” Whilst there is no doubt that the  Harmer  Report was concerned with 
difficulties in determining whether the  defect  in the  demand might  be  sufficient to have  it  set 
aside, it is not clear that the Harmer Report had advocated that the  process be a complete code in 
the sense of excluding other  aspects  of the  Corporations  Act.  The  other  aspect  of the  legislation  
that is  notable  is  that it drifted substantially from the elegance of the proposals as put forward in 
the  Harmer  report.12 For example, the Harmer report had suggested the straightforward provision 
that the court could set aside if it was satisfied there was a substantial dispute whether the debt 
owes; or the company had a counterclaim etc or the demand out to be set aside on other grounds. 
The Commission then went on to recommend that the demand shall not be set aside by reason only 
of a defect or irregularity unless the Court considers that substantial injustice would be caused if it 
were not set aside. The legislation introduced the poorly worded s 459J (1) to give effect to the 
“other grounds” category suggested by the Commission, and hence much confusion has existed 
around defects and their impact. Whilst the legislation as implemented has its faults it is likely that 
not all of the criticism of the current regime can be found in the drafting. Rather, some fault may be 
found with the notion that parties in such circumstances will not engage in any desperate attempt to 
prevent liquidation. In addition the interpretation provided in respect of the legislation as 
introduced has not eased the requirements for litigation in this area. These matters are  elaborated 
upon below.       
In June 2004, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services made a 
recommendation that it would be appropriate to review the operation of the law of statutory 
demands.13 It made no recommendations as to how the law might be changed (if at all) in this area. 
                                                          
10
 See Explanatory Memorandum Corporate Law Reform Bill 1992 at [845] 
11
 Explanatory Memorandum Corporate Law Reform Bill 1992 at [848] 
12
 In respect of the  provisions  relating to statutory demands see  Australian Law Reform Commission, Report 
No 45 General Insolvency Inquiry Vol 2 available at  
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/45/vol2_chap1.pdf 
Accessed 21 January 2012. At  WU8 
 
13
 See Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and  Financial Services, Corporate Insolvency Laws: a 
Stocktake June  2004 at [12.57] available at 
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So far it would seem no such review has taken place. The statutory demand procedure often lies at 
the heart of the compulsory winding up of an insolvent company. Court ordered windings up remain 
a significant part of the insolvency statistics. The latest ASIC insolvency statistics show that this type 
of winding up accounts for around 26% to 33 % of the total insolvency appointments. Although no 
data is available on how many of these arise because of presumed insolvency following non 
compliance with a statutory demand, it is likely that this will be the case given the relative costs 
associated alternative methods of proving insolvency.   
What is the underlying purpose of the statutory demand provisions? 
There are well-accepted purposes behind the use of the statutory demand. It is clearly a process 
designed to aid the creditor who being outside of the company, is unable to be certain of the 
insolvency of the company. Insolvency is recognised as being a position of the company based on a 
complete financial picture. In Sandell v Porter it was made clear that insolvency could only be 
established by looking at the whole of the circumstances.14  Thus individual creditors would be put 
to an enormous (and expensive) task if the creditor were obliged to establish this even though it is 
clear that their particular debt remains unpaid.  Accordingly a system that allows for effective and 
efficient determination of the insolvency can be justified. The information asymmetry can be 
resolved in this process. That is, the individual creditor would normally incur large costs if it needed 
to establish the debtor company’s insolvency. However, a debtor company should be well aware of 
their own financial situation without the need to incur any additional marginal costs and, a solvent 
debtor can pay the relevant debt whereas a debtor who is unable to pay can look to the various 
insolvency procedures available. 
There may be other advantages in the demand process from a broader social perspective. The 
Former Justice Austin made the following remarks15 on the benefits of the statutory demand in our 
system of corporate law: 
What struck me..is how important they [statutory demands] are for the work of the court. 
Uncontested winding–up applications based on failure to comply with a statutory demand 
are processed by court registrars like sausages. I suspect that in many cases the application 
is not contested precisely because of the demand, failure to comply with which has placed 
                                                                                                                                                                      
http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/corporations_ctte/completed_inquiries/2002-
04/ail/report/ail.pdf accessed January 21 2012. 
14
 Sandell v Porter *1966+ HCA 28 at *15+ per Barwick CJ.  ‘The conclusion of insolvency ought to be clear from a 
consideration of the debtor's financial position in its entirety…’ 
15
 Austin RP writing in the Foreword to Assaf, F. Statutory Demands: Law and Practice LexisNexis, Sydney, 2008 
at vi 
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the onus on the company to prove that it is solvent. Just think of the effect that abolition of 
the statutory demand would have on the volume of judicial work. Insolvency would have to 
be proved in every case, many more cases would be contested, and the wheels of justice 
would be clogged. I can think of no better contributor than the statutory demand to the just, 
quick and cheap administration of justice in commercial litigation.  
However, it is also clear that such a process is open to the possibility of abuse. The position of the 
debtor where a dispute has arisen is clearly at a disadvantage if the creditor seeks to use the process 
to place pressure on the debtor. Therefore it is recognised that some balance needs to be struck. A 
well resourced creditor who has a relatively low marginal cost in issuing a demand is in a very strong 
position under the current provisions as the debtor is put to the cost of acting to set aside the 
demand within a short time period. It has been suggested that the procedure is a “powerful and 
attractive weapon”16 particularly for the Australian Taxation Office which is entitled to issue the 
demand despite any objection raised by a taxpayer company in respect of an assessment.17 In an 
ideal insolvency world  creditors  who are  in dispute  will have that dispute resolved  in court and  
then seek to levy execution to have their  judgement enforced and  only if that fails will they seek 
winding  up. However creditors have a much cheaper and quicker option under the statutory 
demand process and it can always still go down the litigation path. So despite the  occasional 
negative  comment by the  courts  in terms  of  not  using the  process to pursue  disputed debts the  
economic reality is  that it  will occur. 
The difficulty lays in finding where the balance should be between facilitating the winding–up of 
insolvent companies and avoiding placing too much pressure on debtors where there is a genuine 
commercial dispute.  The protection afforded to the debtor company in situations of dispute was 
developed by the courts soon after the demand procedure was introduced according to Finklestein J 
in Quadrant Constructions18 where it is noted that the development of the statutory demand process 
was followed19 
Not long afterwards [by] the courts [establishing] the rule that a winding up proceeding 
should not be used to recover a disputed debt: …The proper course was to bring an action 
for the debt:... If in breach of the rule a petition was presented it would be either stood over 
or dismissed to prevent an abuse of the court’s process..except in special circumstances 
                                                          
16
 Assaf F. ‘Statutory Demands- the taxman’s weapon of  choice’ Financial Fallout, December 2008 at 93 
17
 DC of  T v Broadbeach Properties Pty Ltd [2008] HCA 41 
18
 Quadrant Constructions Pty Ltd v HSBC Bank Australia Ltd, in the matter of Quadrant Constructions Pty Ltd  
[2004] FCA 111 
19
 ibid at [1]-[2] case references omitted 
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such as where the creditor was without remedy if denied the right to proceed and where no 
other creditors of the company were prejudiced:... If a petition was threatened its 
presentation could be enjoined to prevent an abuse of process: ..All this was well-known by 
the end of the 19th century. Of course, there were occasions when the rule was ignored. 
Sometimes a person claiming to be a creditor would present a petition, or threaten to do so, 
to put pressure on the company to acknowledge a debt or compromise a claim. But, as the 
law reports indicate, the occasions on which this occurred were few. 
Thus it was clear that the law prior to the changes made in Australia in the 1993 amendments dealt 
with such matters.  
The position of a debtor under the current Australian regime is somewhat different though. Now, 
any debtor who feels that a creditor is “bludgeoning” the company into payment must take action 
via s 459G within the specified time period. To do otherwise is to risk an application being made to 
wind up the company on the basis of insolvency and the possible trigger of lending defaults. 
However the provision of a “code” as a response to the issuing of a statutory demand has channelled 
all disputes and desperate claims through the courts. The ability to obfuscate the winding up process 
by challenging the statutory demand is assisted by some unclear language in s 459J(1). In addition, it 
has been pointed out that the allegation of a disputed debt or counter claim is also quick to be made 
by some debtors but it requires adjudication in a Supreme or Federal Court. Thus  it  might  be asked 
whether the  advantages  identified above  in terms  of  saving  of  court time  are  not  reduced by 
the applications  to set aside the  demand process.  
What of the place of the demand process within our corporate insolvency law more generally? The 
balancing of rights between a debtor and creditors is at the heart of much of the tension in the law 
of insolvency. One key aspect of law reform in insolvency has been in seeking to facilitate corporate 
rescue.20 Harris and Legg21 have commented that: 
 An effective rescue culture will have both informal and formal legal processes that work co-
operatively to facilitate attempts to maximise the value of the business in financial distress. 
Both of these procedures need to work together, and the conduct of each is done in the 
                                                          
20
 See for example Keay A., ‘A Comparative Analysis of Administration Regimes in Australia and the United 
Kingdom’ in Omar P (Ed) International Insolvency Law: Themes and Perspectives, Ashgate 2008 at 105. See 
also Anderson and Morrison ‘The Commencement of Company rescue: How and When does it Start?’ at 83.  
21
 Harris J and Legg M ‘What price investor protection? Class actions vs corporate rescue’ (2009) 17 Insolvency 
Law  Journal 185 at 194 
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shadow of liquidation and a potential fire sale of the assets, a situation where usually 
everyone is worse off. 
If it is accepted that liquidation is potentially a process which is inferior from a creditor’s perspective, 
then it may be asked whether provisions that facilitate the liquidation in the form of the statutory 
demand might not be counterproductive.  However, it can also be noted that there are arguments 
that might be presented against this sentiment. First it is by no means clear that liquidation 
necessarily leads to lower returns to creditors in any particular case. Generally, we can say that there 
is not a great deal of evidence indicating clearly better returns in a rescue situation. Whilst there is 
some anecdotal evidence of some voluntary administrations providing better returns we await 
anything definitive on this point. Further, even accepting that many company circumstances will 
favour a corporate rescue, there will undoubtedly still be situations where liquidation is the only 
commercial possibility and any attempt at a rescue would simply be wasted time and money.  A 
second  point  is  that the  statutory demand  process may in fact aid  in initiating a voluntary 
administration because  it  will cause the  directors  of a company to face the potential insolvency. If 
the board has been ignoring the insolvency, a statutory demand may cause them to seek 
appropriate advice and look to ways of rescuing the company.    Therefore, the statutory demand 
process remains vital to the needs of creditors. However, as we have stated, the balance between 
creditor and debtor interests must be struck in a way that does not lead to excessive litigation which 
is wasteful for both parties and possibly the broader community as well.  
In summary therefore this section has argued that the demand procedure provides an effective 
means for a creditor to deal with their information asymmetry about the company’s overall financial 
position. Second, there are potential benefits at a public level as courts are not faced with dealing 
with detailed evidence about the financial position of the company. Third there needs to be though 
a recognition that the process is open to abuse in situations where debts are in dispute or a 
counterclaim is available. The approach of the courts prior to the 1993 amendments sought to deal 
with this issue. Since 1993 the strict legalistic manner in which this aspect has been dealt with does 
potentially detract from both the  broader benefits  of  having reduced court time  dealing with 
these issues and  also from the  ability of  debtors  to challenge  the  demand. Finally whether the 
demand process helps or hinders corporate rescue is not entirely obvious and the legalistic form of 
the current challenge provisions may suggest at least a potential for discouraging rescue which 
suggests some conflict in the direction of insolvency law reform trends. However, it is assumed that 
there remains a need for the statutory demand in the winding-up of companies and so in the next 
part of the paper we consider some of the current issues being faced by the courts. 
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Current Legislation 
Whatever is thought of the broader purpose of the demand procedure it is necessary to examine the 
actual provisions and their interpretation in order to provide an effective evaluation. The current 
legislation has now been in operation for over fifteen years. During this time there has been a 
significant amount of litigation reported around the operation of the process. Whilst it  would  be  
expected that new  legislation may require a period of time  before  matters are  clarified, there have  
been a number  of  areas where uncertainty has  remained. The purpose of this section of the paper 
is not to deal with the provisions in any detail. Indeed part of the difficulty with this area is that so 
much case law22 has developed in this relatively short period that this in itself detracts from the 
efficacy of the provisions.23 That is, the legislation was introduced as a code in order to provide a 
clear set of processes and to reduce litigation around demands at least in respect of at the time of 
the winding-up hearing.24 It has succeeded in effectively eliminating disputes over the demand being 
argued at the hearing stage but it has by no means eliminated the disputes themselves, only the 
timing of those disputes. As long ago as 1998, Keay commented25 that  
..it is submitted that the present state of the law is untenable, as the intention of the 
legislature in introducing a code to simplify the statutory demand procedure and to produce 
time savings for the courts has not been achieved. 
Whilst it might be suggested that issues around unpaid debts and insolvency ought to be resolved in 
a legal setting26, it is surely beneficial if matters were able to be clearly understood by directors and 
those in business generally rather than frequently requiring court adjudication.  
It is not the intention in this paper to examine the provisions of the legislation and the case law that 
interprets and applies them in any comprehensive manner. Rather we seek to highlight some areas 
                                                          
22
 For  example  the  dedicated text  on statutory demands is  over  400 pages in length: see Assaf F., Statutory 
Demands: Law and Practice LexisNexis, Sydney, 2008 
23
 See Karen O’Flynn in her unpublished  paper The  Harmer Amendments: 15 years  on available at 
http://www.claytonutz.com/people/oflynn_karen/docs/UNSW_insolvency_paper.pdf Accessed 21 January 
2012where it is stated *at 9+ that ‘..it is clear that, as well as the  usual disputes about the existence or 
quantum of debts, the current statutory demand regime is a technical nightmare. ‘ 
24
 See the discussion above at p 2 
25
 Keay A., ‘Finding a Way Through the Maze that is the  Law of Statutory Demands’ (1998) 16 Companies and  
Securities Law Journal 122 at 138 
26
 It has been suggested that ‘No instructions are sweeter than those that require counsel to seek to set aside a 
wanton statutory demand.’ Aitken L., and Stowe H ‘Issues in corporate insolvency: Statutory demands and 
Corporations Act, s440A (2005) 79 Australian Law Journal 182. The author in this article does go on to state 
though that the law is “reasonably clear” which may be an overstatement in some respects.  
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that we suggest demonstrate a need to consider reforms.  One area which has generated 
controversy is the question as to whether solvency of the debtor company ought to be a basis for 
setting aside a demand.  A leading text in this area suggests27 that there is some ‘uncertainty’ over 
this issue though the ‘prevailing view’ is that it is not relevant. In Kekatos and Another v Holmark 
Construction Co Pty Ltd 28,Young J made the statement that ‘[o]rdinarily, a company is expected to 
put its claim that it is not insolvent at the stage of resisting a statutory demand.’ This statement flies 
in the face of most of the reasoning in other cases.29 In particular the comment of Landers J in 
Master Paving Pty Ltd v Heading Contractors Pty Ltd30  make it clear that it would  be ‘inappropriate’ 
for a debtor company to say in response to a demand that it  need not pay because it was solvent. 
The statement by Lander J was heavily criticised by Keay31 as being ‘very creditor oriented’. He 
pointed out the fact that it was necessary to obtain leave at the winding–up hearing and also 
because it goes against a principle reason for introducing the  code  in Part  5.4 in the  first place,  
namely to enable disputes to be  sorted earlier and to reduce costs. Keay’s criticisms were in turn 
rebuffed by O’Gorman32 who argued that as the statutory scheme provided for insolvency to be 
determined at the winding-up hearing stage, the sensible position for a solvent debtor is to deal with 
the demand by some form of payment or compound with the creditor and also that the nature of 
the  challenge  to a statutory demand is  inappropriate  to deal with the detailed questions required 
to prove  solvency. There is clearly some merit though in both sides of the argument here and the 
difficulty with resolving this issue might be illustrated in Paperlinx Ltd v Skidmore33 where the 
creditor had been engaged in lengthy wrongful dismissal proceedings against the debtor company. 
The creditor issued a statutory demand which the company paid part of but argued that it was 
obliged to retain a certain amount to comply with tax obligations. The creditor refused to accept this 
part payment as the end of the demand and claimed it was entitled to proceed to the winding-up 
application. The debtor company was clearly solvent and was listed on the ASX. In looking at the 
action of the creditor Finklestein J made34 the following comment  
When I asked ... whether the defendant intended to move for the plaintiff's winding up 
based on its purported failure to comply with the statutory demand Mr Scerri sensibly 
                                                          
27
 Gronow M., McPherson's Law of Company Liquidation Thomson Reuters, online, 2012 at [3.690] 
28
 121 FLR 39 at 40 
29
 See for example Liverpool Cement Renderers (Aust) Pty Ltd v Landmarks Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd (1996) 
19 ACSR 411 
30
 (1997) 15 ACLC 1.025 at 1,032 
31
 Keay A., ‘Finding a Way Through the Maze that is the  Law of Statutory Demands’ (1998) 16 Companies and  
Securities Law Journal 122 at 134 
32
 O’Gorman K., ‘Sidestepping the statutory demand: is solvency a solution?’ (2002) 10 Insolvency Law Journal 
239 
33
 [2004] FCA 1624 
34
 [2004] FCA 1624 at [7] 
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acknowledged that his client did not. It would have been better if Mr Scerri's client had said 
so much earlier. In that event there would not have been any need for this application, the 
parties time would not have been wasted and legal expenses would have been avoided. 
Unfortunately that did not happen. The defendant kept alive the threat of winding up 
proceedings and in the result I have an application to set aside the statutory demand which 
must now be disposed of. 
The creditor argued that it was not possible to set aside the demand simply because the debtor was 
solvent. Finklestein J decided that the position was not so clear cut. Instead he  held that whether 
solvency is  relevant depends on the  circumstances and  in circumstances such as this the  threat of 
the winding up where it is  not  intended to proceed is  an abuse of process which will justify setting 
the demand aside. Undoubtedly this  was a sensible  outcome  in the facts  of the case but  it  only 
goes  to demonstrate the  difficulty faced by a solvent debtor  in certain  circumstances. When will 
they be able to be certain that the creditor is acting by way of an abuse of process? How might this 
be determined within the time frame required to set aside the demand. It will always be prudent for 
a debtor to apply to have the demand set aside as otherwise negative consequences potentially flow 
but it maybe an expensive exercise if it is rejected and the court determines the matter should be 
argued at the winding up stage.   
A second example of the difficulties in the provisions relates to the requirement in s 459E that the 
demand be in the prescribed form35 which is Form 509H. The form requires36 that the address for 
service must be in the State or Territory in which the demand is served on the company. This 
requirement in the form is clearly for the benefit of the debtor. As Bryne J37 explained in respect of 
the requirement 
 Given the serious consequences for the debtor of a failure to make application under 
s 459G and the inflexible time frame within which this must be done, it is important that 
there be no room for doubts [sic] to these matters. It was doubtless with this in mind that 
the prescribed form ... was prepared with par 6 included.    
However what is the situation where the address for service is not the same State or Territory as to 
where the debtor is served? Clearly that represents a defect in the demand. However because of the 
                                                          
35
 Corporations Regulations 1.0.03 
36
 Paragraph 6 is as follows: The address of the creditor for service of copies of any application and affidavit is 
(insert the address for service of the documents in the State or Territory in which the demand is served on the 
company, being, if solicitors are acting for the creditor, the address of the solicitors). 
37
 Marlan Financial Services Pty Ltd v New England Agricultural Traders Pty Ltd [1999] VSC 435 at [12] 
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strict requirements under s 459G any challenge must be made in accordance with that section. The 
argument that by failing to provide such an address, the demand can be fails to comply with the 
requirements to such an extent that the demand is not a demand that complies with Part 5.4, has 
been rejected.38 This results in the debtor being required to effectively pay for the error of the 
creditor by way of serving the challenge interstate. Service interstate will require compliance with 
the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 which overrides the Corporations Act in respect of 
service.39  The facts in Marlan Financial Services40 illustrate the point of difficulty here and produce a 
result that Bryne J described as ‘remarkable’. In that case the corporate creditor inserted an 
interstate address for service in the statutory demand which the debtor in turn used to serve the 
documents under s 459G. However because this was not the registered address of the creditor 
company, the service was not effective for the purposes of the Service and Execution of Process Act. 
The court is left in a difficult position in these types of circumstances as they are bound by 
limitations imposed under s 459G. There is no clear remedy for the debtor and no inconvenience or 
sanction provided for the creditor.   There have been attempts to overcome this difficulty by some 
creative orders. In Re Beralt Pty Ltd41 Ambrose J did make a declaration that there was non-
compliance with the requirements of the demand and that this meant it was insufficient to support 
an application to wind-up the company. In Ultimate Manufacturing Pty Ltd v Lyell Morris Pty Ltd42, 
Master Mahoney made an order that if any winding up application was made, the creditor inform 
the court that: 
    (a) the demand on which the winding up application is made was held defective in that it 
did not specify an address of the respondent for service in Victoria; 
    (b) it was also held that the applicant had not made an application under s 459G but that 
this was due to the defect and was not the fault of the applicant; 
    (c) it was further held that if there were a winding up application based on the defective 
demand the respondent could expect to be required to show cause why s 467A(b) should 
not apply so as to require that the application be dismissed — 
and further that a copy of the order as authenticated be attached to the winding up application. 
                                                          
38
 See Sustainable Organics (Wooshaway) Pty Ltd v Ranger Loaders Pty Ltd [2011] QSC 45. 
39
 Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) s9(9) 
40
 Marlan Financial Services Pty Ltd v New England Agricultural Traders Pty Ltd [1999] VSC 435 at [16] 
41
 (2001) Qd R 232; [1999] QSC 202 
42
 (1995) 13 ACLC 1,268 at 1,271 
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It appears though that Bryne J doubted the correctness of this type of order in Marlan Financial 
Services.43  
Even if it is accepted that there are possible situations where the court will make some form of 
injunctive relief in these circumstances, the process is an expensive and uncertain one.44 Whilst it 
might be argued that debtors should be aware of the requirements of serving  documents interstate, 
it is suggested here that this is  an example  of the unnecessarily legalistic nature  of the  of the  
process.     
There are other difficulties with the provisions several of which have been well documented. Some 
of these (and by no means an exhaustive list) are: 
 In relation to the disputed debt under s 459H, while the law appears to be is relatively clear 
there remains some variation in the emphasis in explaining a ‘disputed debt’.45 As Keay46 has 
stated ‘[t]he problem in this area is not so much the state of the law, but the huge volume of 
cases that are being decided.’ As noted above the impact of the scheme of the legislation is 
that all disputes whether genuine or not get channelled to the courts. 
 The well litigated issue  of the meaning of  s 459J(1)(a) & (b) in terms of whether defects are  
confined to s 459J(1)(a) seems to have  been resolved following the  decision in Spencer 
Constructions Pty Ltd v G & M Aldridge Pty Ltd47 . However, Gronow suggests that the view 
that the court may face defects in the demand of such magnitude that it can be set aside 
under s 459J(1)(b) ’has had some supporters’.48  
 To what extent can a deficiency be so great that the document cannot be considered a 
demand? This point was raised in NT Resorts Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation 49 
but it is difficult in practical terms to see how such an argument might succeed given the 
definition of statutory demand in s 9.50 This difficulty was noted by Douglas J in Nasrawi 
                                                          
43
 Marlan Financial Services Pty Ltd v New England Agricultural Traders Pty Ltd [1999] VSC 435 at [43] 
44
 See also Peak Hill Manganese Pty Ltd v Hydraplant Equipment Pty Ltd [2003] WASC 120 at [72] 
45
 See for example Re Morris Catering (Aust) Pty Ltd (1993) 11 ACSR 601;  Spencer Constructions Pty Ltd v G & 
M Aldridge Pty Ltd (1997) 76 FCR 452; Scanhill Pty Ltd v Century 21 Australasia Pty Ltd (1993) 47 FCR 451; 
Eyota Pty Ltd v Hanave Pty Ltd (1994) 12 ACSR 785 
46
 Keay A., ‘Finding a Way Through the Maze that is the  Law of Statutory Demands’ (1998) 16 Companies and  
Securities Law Journal 122 at 138; see also Polaroid Australia Pty Ltd v Minicomp Pty Ltd (1998) 16 ACLC 529 
47
 (1997) 76 FCR 452 
48
 Gronow M., McPherson's Law of Company Liquidation Thomson Reuters, online, 2012 at [3.660] referring to 
Wildtown Holdings Pty Ltd v Rural Traders Co Pty Ltd (2002) 172 FLR 35. 
49
 (1998) 38 ATR 425 
50
 This is that a statutory demand means ‘(a) a document that is, or purports to be, a demand served under 
section 459E.’ This seems to suggest that anything will do provide it purports to be a demand!  
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Group of Companies Pty Ltd v Bryne Earthmoving & Engineering Pty Ltd.51 Again, it may be 
asked if the balance has swung too far in favour of the creditor who issues the demand.  
 There are a number of issues around the meaning of ‘some other reason’ in s 459J(1)(b). 
One is whether an impending appeal may be a reason to set aside the demand. Some cases 
suggest it is possible.52 Others suggest this is not enough to constitute some other reason.53 
 The issue around the tight time frame and how this has coloured all balance of rights 
between the debtor and the creditor has been a key feature of the changes implemented 
following Harmer. The High Court in the David Grant54 case made it clear that the legislative 
intention and language implying quick resolution of the issues around the statutory demand 
limit the ability to utilise other ameliorating provisions in the Corporations Act. Whilst this is 
consistent with the statutory language it can nevertheless be asked whether this suggests 
the legislation is in need of a change to provide more balance. The decision in Aussie Vic 
Plant Hire55  has demonstrated the  ‘harshness’56 of these  influences and as Lipton has 
asked57   
The court’s approach really leaves one to question whether the judiciary has gone 
too far in applying such timeframes and has become too process focused.. Any 
notion of substantive justice it seems has been thrown out the window at the cost of 
commercial certainty. 
  
Recommendations for reform 
As stated above, if a debtor company does not take an action under s 459G to set aside the statutory 
demand, it risks being made to wind up. In addition, s 459S(1) precludes a debtor company from 
opposing an application winding up on any grounds that it relied on for the purpose of having the 
statutory demand set aside and, more importantly, could have relied on but did not so rely. The 
effect of these two provisions means that a debtor company that does not apply to the court to set 
                                                          
51
 [2005] QSC 002 at [6] 
52
 See Eumina Investments Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp (1998) 16 ACLC 1440; Midas Management Pty Ltd v 
Equator Communications Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 759; Ozy Homewares Pty Ltd v Wesgordon Pty Ltd [2007] 
NSWSC 982. 
53
 Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network GP (2010) 28 ACLC 249 
54
 David Grant & Co Pty Ltd  v Westpac Banking  Corp [1995] HCA 43 
55
 Aussie Vic  Plant Hire Pty Ltd v Esanda Finance Corp Ltd [2008] HCA 9 
56
 David Grant & Co Pty Ltd  v Westpac Banking  Corp [1995] HCA 43  
57
 Lipton J ‘Extending the time for compliance with a statutory demand-A need for commercial certainty’ 
(2008) 16 Insolvency Law Journal 211 at 220 
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aside statutory demand will be later penalised for not doing so in a potential application for winding 
up.58  It may be that a creditor is using the statutory demand mechanism as a debt collection method 
regardless of the solvency of a company. As a matter of commercial reality, there may be legitimate 
reasons that a debtor company has deferred payment of a particular debt, without the company 
necessarily being insolvent. Under the current framework, once a demand served the risk lies purely 
with the debtor company. Therefore, if the debtor company wishes to oppose the winding–up, it 
must take the matter to court. That is, there are no real penalties imposed on the creditor under the 
current regime for using the statutory demand for purposes other than determining the solvency of 
the debtor company, other than the awarding of costs under s 459N. This means that issuing a 
statutory demand when a debt is owed is a fairly straightforward issue from the creditor’s point of 
view. Certainly it is much simpler and cheaper than pursuing execution. However, there are very 
significant reasons for the debtor company to take the matter to court. The forced litigation can be 
seen as wasteful and it can even be argued that further reform is needed in order to balance the 
rights of the debtor company and its creditors. A number of changes have been suggested to 
improve the process. This section examines some of these. 
One mechanism may be to deter creditor claims by introducing a higher minimum amount. The 
question as to what the minimum amount should be was raised by the Commission in the Harmer 
Report. After some debate, the Commission opted for a minimum amount which they considered 
would low enough to ensure that smaller creditors would have the ability to issue a statutory 
demand, but sufficiently high enough to “remove the likelihood of trivial claims.”59 Specifically, the 
Commission recommended that the prescribed minimum amount be set at $2,000 by the regulation, 
so that it could be increased without the need to amend by legislation. Given that the Harmer 
Report was tabled in 1988, there should be (at the very least) a review of this amount.60 However, it 
may be more prudent for the regulation to set a base amount which is indexed on an annual basis. 
This would not necessarily preclude the need for further review of the minimum amount, but it 
would at least address general economic growth. 
While this option would deter trivial matters being raised by way of issuing a statutory demand, 
there is also a need to ensure that only disputes that are “genuine” are bought to the court. 
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 Section 459S does provide partial relief in that the debtor may seek leave of the court to oppose the demand 
on the winding-up action, however, that will apply only if the ground for not bringing an action under s 459G 
is material to proving that the company is solvent (s 459S(2)). It is arguable that this mechanism merely 
creates the need for further litigation. 
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 Australian Law Reform Commission, Report No 45 General Insolvency Inquiry, available at  
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/45/ Accessed 21 January 2012. At [146] 
60
 It is worth noting that a review was carried out in relation to the comparison amount in the bankruptcy 
notices, which as a result of that review is now set at $5,000. See Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 41. 
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Therefore, another mechanism might be to introduce a costs regime that penalises directors of 
debtor companies where there is no “genuine dispute” as to the debt owed.61 This might discourage 
directors from engaging in an action for setting aside statutory demands for the predominant 
purpose of postponing the winding-up of the company. Although costs may be awarded against the 
debtor company under the current regime, a more personal director’s liability would be stronger 
deterrent. 
As this paper has identified, one of the key issues with the statutory demand regime as it currently 
operates relates to the poor wording adopted, particularly in s 459J. Therefore, a further reform 
might be to redraft the legislation, particularly ss 459H and 459J, in the manner intended by the 
Harmer Report. It appears that the overall intention of the current regime was to adopt the 
Commission’s recommendations in relation to the grounds for setting aside statutory demands.62 
However, it appears that the legislation as ultimately drafted introduced, perhaps inadvertently, a 
two part test to the question of ‘defects’; that is first the Court must be satisfied a substantial 
injustice would result where it is argued that there is a defect in the demand, and second, for “some 
other reason”, which appears to preclude issues related to defects in the demand.63 As we have 
argued above, the current wording of s 459J has resulted in confusion around defects in statutory 
demands and to what extent those defects may be grounds for setting aside the demand. The 
advantage of the measure intended by the Commission is its simplicity and clarity, while still 
providing some discretion to the Court. Furthermore, the inclusion of a general “other” clause that is 
limited in scope to issues that result in substantial injustice provides a safeguard against litigation 
that is carried out by the debtor company merely to defer payment of the debt. 
Another reform might be to adopt an approach similar to that in bankruptcy, where a creditor must 
secure a judgment debt before being able to issue the bankruptcy notice.64 At the time of Harmer 
Report, it was put to the Commission that this option would place the onus on creditors to ensure 
that the statutory demand was not used merely as a debt collection mechanism. However, the 
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 Keay A., ‘Finding a Way Through the Maze that is the Law of Statutory Demands’ (1998) 16 Companies and 
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 See Spencer Constructions Pty Ltd v G & M Aldridge Pty Ltd (1997) 76 FCR 452, c/f Topfelt Pty Ltd v State 
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 See Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 41. 
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Commission was of the view that this approach could not be justified.65 In any event, it is difficult to 
see how this would address the need to reduce litigation.66 
One way to alleviate litigation, at least at the Supreme Court/Federal Court level, would be to 
introduce mechanisms that allow the lower courts to deal with statutory demands. In the Harmer 
Report, the Commission recommended that the legislation include a power to confer jurisdiction for 
determining applications to set aside statutory demands on the lower courts on the basis that “*t+his 
would relieve the Supreme Courts of the burden of determining issues of disputed debt where the 
amount in issue is less than what would normally be dealt with by a Supreme Court (whether 
‘beneath the dignity’ of that Court or not).”67 Alternatively, the legislation could be reformed to 
establish a tribunal body charged with the responsibility of dealing with the more routine disputes. 
Clearly, relieving the Supreme Court from the volume of statutory demand cases was an important 
objective of the Harmer Report.68 However, this recommendation was not adopted, nor does it 
appear that it was given any consideration in drafting the legislation.  
One other  suggestion which has  been proposed  by O’Flynn is that the  1993 changes are  removed  
and the  pre-Harmer  position is  installed.69 She notes that apart from the inconsistency in the 
courts there was little wrong with the previous system. There was in her view very little litigation 
compared to the current system and it did not operate ‘harshly’. It seems that given the  legislation 
has moved now  to  a national system it  may be  that there would  be  less inconsistency between 
the  courts in various states than was the  case in the  1980’s. In addition if the litigation were 
reduced it would be a very positive outcome for all parties. However,  the  need for  some  
mechanism to resolve  disputed debts might  still be  needed in some  situations and  it  would  be  
likely that some major  creditors may see a change  of this type  as a diminution of their  position. 
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Conclusion 
The original intention of the Harmer Report was to recommend a specific regime in which disputes 
about debt and other issues could be effectively determined by way of a statutory demand, with 
minimal involvement of the court. As this paper has shown, the Commission’s objectives have not 
been achieved. It has been argued in this paper that this is in part due to the implementation of the 
Commission’s recommendations, but also the result of human nature. There will be no easy solution 
in this area. The position of a company when faced with possible winding-up proceedings will almost 
certainly be to fight on every stage that it can. This means that whatever the law as stated in the 
legislation every possible argument or step to stave off the evil day will be made. It is suggested 
therefore that it will not be possible to solve all of the problems raised here by changing legislation. 
In addition creditors are likely to see any change with makes it more difficult for them to seek a 
liquidation order as a retrograde step.  
Nevertheless it is argued that at least some changes could be made to improve the situation. The 
possibilities raised above as possible solutions may be a starting point. Some detailed analysis of 
what the legislation is seeking to do and even some data on the impact of the current processes 
might be a way forward.    Whilst other aspects of the 1993 changes have been re-examined perhaps 
the most definite statement that may be made at this stage is that review of the current statutory 
demand process is well overdue.  
 
